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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

sympathyand indifferenceof men to women. Perryadmits this antidiscriminationargument
is counter-factual.If this is so, thereis no principledway to drawthe line between permitting
abortionsin situationsof incest, rape, and the possibility of a deformedchild but not in other
situations. Perry's antidiscriminationprinciple is too much like the differences approach
which seeks to protect women (and other subordinatedgroups) only when they engage in
behaviors similar to those of dominantgroups. Rights-basedconstitutionaltheories, such as
Perry'santidiscriminationprinciple, need to be supplementedwith far more complex theories
of polity malfunctionsfor subordinatedgroups. This book is must readingfor bothjurisprudes
and Court followers.
RONALD KAHN

Oberlin College

The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory: 1953-1993 by Ronald Kahn.
Lawrence, Universityof Kansas Press, 1994. 320 pp. $35. 00.
Ronald Kahn takes legal culture seriously. On one level, this book is a comprehensiveand
effective treatmentof the central political ideas that have dominatedscholarly and political
discussion of the Court for the last forty years. Kahn considers each of a large numberof
influential theories about the role of the Court, from the pluralist politics of Robert Dahl,
througha detailed treatmentof work by John Ely, MartinShapiro, SanfordLevinson, Mark
Tushnet, and Larry Tribe, among others, to recent writing about the role of civic republicanism. He finds each of them wanting in explanatoryand practicalpower. In their placeand arguablypresent all along-Kahn offers a dialogic frameworkbuilt upon two key elements. The first is a dialectic of polity (for example, where decision-makingpower should
be located) and individualrights as the implicit frameworkof at least the last four decades
of conceptual theory and actual case-by-case decision making by the Court. The second is
an acknowledgementthat this constitutive dialogue takes place within the specific context
of a particularinterpretivecommunity(for example, the scholars, politicians, lawyers, journalists, and others who are the centralconsumersof the Court'swork). In the jurisprudential
and practicalframeworkthatsets the terms of the dialogue here, Kahnargues, law and ideas
matterat least as much as politics. In the process, Kahntakes serious issue with the conventional instrumentaltheories typically associated with Dahl and others that the Court is best
understood as another type of political body with a framework for decision making only
superficially altered from that at work in the openly political branches of government. In
effect (and in what amounts to an unstated contributionto modern centrist legal theory),
Kahn takes both critique and legalism seriously and argues that the juxtapositionof critique
and legalism is not only possible but necessary. For this reason, the argumentis an important
one worth even more elaborate development.
On another level, using this analysis, Kahn takes issue with the received wisdom of
the dominant understandingof the Warren and Burger Courts. The conventional wisdom
characterizesthe WarrenCourtas one dominatedby rightsand informedby a clear, conceptually coherentjurisprudence;while the BurgerCourtis typically presented(in Vincent Blasi's
words) as "thecounter-revolutionthatwasn't,"hamperedby a shallow, undistinguished,and
less principledjurisprudence.Kahnargues thatboth characterizationsare misconceived. He
argues thatthe WarrenCourt was far more simplistic and less removed from the apologetic
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pluralisticperspective ascendantamong political scientists at the time and that the jurisprudence of the Burger Court involved a more sophisticatedand consistent understandingof
polity versus rights thanthatused by the WarrenCourt. As a secondary,but importantpoint,
he also argues that the dominantinterpretationof the WarrenCourt as rights-basedand the
Burger Court as political is linked ultimatelyto the explanatoryand theoreticaldifficulties
inherent in the instrumentalismand interest group politics that dominatedpolitical science
discourse during those periods.
Perhaps this could have been two books ratherthan one, and perhaps there could have
been a deeper entry into some of the wealth of recent legal theory work. But that is a small
matterthat ultimately underscoresthe potentialpotency of the argument.
DONALD H. GJERDINGEN

Indiana University-Bloomington

America'sMission:TheUnitedStatesandtheWorldwideStruggleforDemocracy
in the TwentiethCenturyby Tony Smith. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1994. 455 pp. $24.95.
For political scientists, some have said half in jest, history ended in 1945 and international
relationsbegan. Tony Smithpoints out thatWorldWarII also led political scientiststo isolate
internationalfrom nationalpolitics; and he says, not at all in jest, that the results have been
bad both for them and those they would influence. Studentsof internationalrelationsignore
domestic politics both as potentialcause and consequence; studentsof comparativepolitics
ignoreinternationalpressureson politicaldevelopment.Marxistshaveavoidedthe separation,
but are hamperedas usual by a refusal to take states'desires for physical securityas seriously
as those for profits.
Smith would reconcile the studies of internal and external politics by illustratingtheir
interactionin twentieth-centuryAmerican foreign policy. He argues that most U.S. leaders
have genuinely tried to spreadliberaldemocracyto foreign countriesbecause they believe a
democraticworld saferfor America. He arguesthatdemocratizationhas oftenbeen successful,
most notably in the postwar liberalizationsof Germanyand Japan. Finally, he argues that
the United Stages ought to carry this Wilsonianisminto the twenty-firstcentury, albeit with
more skill and humility.
Smithwill doubtlessdrawthe ire of those who considerWilsonianismdangeroussentimentality, veiled imperialism,or capitalisthypocrisy. Yet he is highly persuasive. He teases out
a brightthreadthatrunsthroughthe policies of McKinley, Taft, Wilson, FranklinRoosevelt,
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, toward such nations
as the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,Nicaragua, Iran, Vietnam, Chile,
Grenada,South Africa, Germany, and Japan. Americanleaders talk and act as though they
believed democratizationvital to U.S. security.
WhereWilsonianismhas failed, Americanshave typicallymisunderstoodlocal conditions,
especially the need for land reform, andhave been reluctantto alienateantidemocraticelites.
They (and their critics) have also overestimatedAmerica'spower to shape foreign polities.
Most notoriously, they have opposed truedemocratswho seemed too sympatheticto communism. Smith might have explainedthis paradoxmore clearly by reiteratingthatdemocratization has been a means to the end of nationalsecurity ratherthan a pious end in itself. It was

